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William F. Stewart. Canadians on the Somme, 1916: The Neglected 
Campaign. Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, 2017. Pp. xvi + 376.
Much has been written about the Somme Offensive, most of it 
negative. The faulty planning, seemingly careless waste of lives 
and the stubborn persistence of its chief architect despite repeated 
failures and deteriorating conditions have made the very name 
“Somme” symbolic of the futility of the entire First World War and 
the incompetence and unmerited arrogance of the senior generals. 
Yet, even though it was the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s first 
campaign and the longest and costliest with the exception of the 
Hundred Days Campaign in 1918, William F. Stewart believes that 
it has been neglected by Canadian historians.
It is true that there are no Canadian books among the extensive 
literature on the Somme other than those written about the destruction 
of the Newfoundland Regiment, but it has not been totally neglected. 
P.A. Errett’s early account in Canada and the Great War, published 
in 1920, devoted eighty-four pages to it, but G.W.L. Nicholson’s 
Canadian Expeditionary Force limited it to only forty pages. Tim 
Cook was more thorough in At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting 
the Great War, giving it 128 pages.1
Even so, while acknowledging that Cook’s book is “superb,” 
Stewart argues that the Somme Offensive was so important to the 
Canadian Corps’s development as an effective fighting force that it 
requires closer examination, an argument with which I have no doubt 
Cook would agree (p. 2). Stewart’s goals, therefore, are to examine 
closely how the Canadian Corps fought on the Somme; to evaluate 
its performance by focusing on operations, tactics, and command 
control down to the battalion level; and to identify what, if anything, 
it learned from the experience and how it changed by the spring of 
1917. In doing so, he explains why the Canadian Corps was assigned 
the responsibility for the assault on Vimy Ridge in April 1917, the 
1  P.A. Errett, “The Somme Offensive,” in Canada in the Great World War, Vol. 4 
(Toronto: United Publishers of Canada Limited, 1920), 10-94; G.W.L. Nicholson, 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1962), 160-200; 
and Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916 
(Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 405-432. Errett’s account is worth reading still 
because he was there with the 38th Battalion and was wounded during its attack on 
Desire Trench and Grandcourt on 18 November 1916.
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first time that a Dominion corps was entrusted with a critical task on 
the first day of a key offensive on the Western Front.
Since the Canadian Corps’s only real experience before Vimy 
was on the Somme, what had it done to be given this responsibility? 
In a nutshell, its officers had learned from the experience of the 
Somme, and this is the core of Canadians on the Somme. When 
the officers and men of the Canadian Corps joined the offensive in 
September 1916, they had little battle experience, with the exception 
of the 1st Division. Since the Corps was, for the most part, made up 
of citizen soldiers, not professionals, they had a lot to learn. Mistakes 
were made, planning and artillery support were generally inadequate, 
and the ability of senior officers far behind the front line to control 
operations once launched was almost nonexistent.
There were also leadership problems. The harsh truth was 
that some of the Corps’s senior officers were incapable of providing 
effective leadership or adapting to modern warfare. The most notable 
cases, of course, were Edwin Alderson, the Corps commander, and 
Richard Turner, commander of the 2nd Division. Alderson was 
replaced by Julian Byng, a change that Stewart praises. On the 
other hand, as in his previous book The Embattled General: Sir 
Richard Turner and the First World War (2015), he is critical of 
Turner’s removal, pointing out that Turner’s 2nd Division “won the 
most clear-cut Canadian victory on the Somme [at Courcelette] while 
Arthur Currie’s 1st Division had a mixed record” (p. 1). Despite 
appearances, as Stewart recognises, the removal of Turner was not a 
demotion: he was removed from a combat role, in which he did not 
perform well, and given the critically important task of training the 
Canadian troops in England and serving as the government’s chief 
overseas military advisor, a role in which he excelled. 
Byng, and later Currie, recognised the need for the Corps to learn 
from its successes and failures and to be willing to adopt new tactics 
and methods. One thing Currie learned was that the key to success 
was thorough preparation in all respects, and that included ensuring 
that officers down to the lowest level fully understood the objectives 
and their role in achieving them. This offset the inability of senior 
officers to control operations once begun and in effect enabled the 
Corps to fight on the platoon level, which proved to be very effective. 
Haig also learned something from the Somme experience: that citizen 
soldiers from the Dominions were as effective as, or even more effective 
than, British troops when properly trained and managed. This was 
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why he assigned the Canadian Corps the daunting task of capturing 
Vimy Ridge in the next offensive. There was, in other words, a direct 
connection between the Somme and Vimy. 
It was not just the senior officers who learned from the Somme 
experience. So too did Prime Minister Robert Borden. The result 
was that Minister of Militia Sam Hughes was fired a month after 
Courcelette and Turner was sent to England to reorganise the 
training of Canadian troops there. Turner was the right man for the 
job and no one now doubts that the subsequent success of the Corps 
reflected not just Currie’s skilful leadership in the field but Turner’s 
improvements in training, and generally competent administration. 
Currie’s success in the field in 1917 and 1918 owed much to the work 
Turner did in England, and he knew it. It was not coincidental that 
in the spring of 1917 Hughes’s disruptive representative in England, 
John Carson, was fired and Turner was promoted to lieutenant 
general with a knighthood.
This is a valuable book, not so much because it tells us much 
that is new but because it provides a wealth of detail and analysis. It 
is intended for specialists, not casual readers or even undergraduate 
students because of the overwhelming level of detail and the density 
of the writing. Its thoroughness is displayed not just in its text but 
by the fact that it is accompanied by a separate booklet that contains 
thirty-six pages of maps. Inevitably, some will regret Stewart’s 
treatment (or lack of treatment) of some battalions in some instances, 
but that is a minor quibble. 
brian douglas tennyson, cape breton university
3
Tennyson: Review of "Canadians on the Somme" by William F. Stewart
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier,
